Monthly Archives: June 2014

AIPA enters the colour vision debate

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The Australian & International Pilots Association has written directly to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development Warren Truss over CASA’s handling of the Debate over colour vision deficiency CVD affected pilots.

Formed in 1981, AIPA represents about 2, 250 Qantas group pilots, making it Australia’s largest pilot representative group.

AIPA President Nathan Safe explained to the Minister that his Association felt a direct approach was necessary because CASA director John McCormick had shown a determination to persist with a strategy to unwind Australia’s advances in managing the issue with a policy that has been vindicated by many years and thousands of hours of safe flight by pilots with CVD.

“However, CASA has now embarked on a set of tactics to unwind that position,” said Mr Safe.

Mr McCormick had signalled the shift in CASA’s position on May 26 when he told the Senate Estimates Committee:

“The overriding principle here, whether it is colour vision deficiency, hearing deficiency or any sort of impairment on the pilot, is safety. We are talking about going towards an ATPL (air transport pilot license), when there is no standard of which we are aware for issuing an ATPL anywhere in the world, for what would be the benefit of a number of pilots – I think we are talking about a few hundred pilots in total. I agree they should be able to do the best they can in their career but our responsibility is to maintain the safety of the Australian travelling public. When we get to the point where we are pushing the boundaries, where we are pushing the science, looking for other ways to get around what could possibility be indicated from the clinical side is a dangerous thing to do, we are starting to impact on my ability to discharge my duties under section 9 of the Civil Aviation Act, and that is to provide safety as outlined in that act the.

“If we wish to go there, then we have to go there in a measured manner. We will not go there on one basic flight test. I am sorry, but we will research this as much as necessary and, with all due respect, I will not be issuing an ATPL to a person who has failed the test as outlined in [Civil Aviation Safety Regulation] 67.”

Mr McCormick made no reference at the committee hearing to the comprehensive 30-Day 1989 AAT test case which had been the basis of the regulator’s policy for 25 years until CASA’s recent reopening of the CVD debate.

Just ten days later, CASA’s ‘Permissions Centre’ manager wrote to AOC holders and separately to affected pilots, signalling its intention to review what AIPA describes as “one of the most enlightened policy positions in world aviation in regard to permitting pilots to fly in commercial service despite having an identified Colour Vision Deficiency (CVD).”

“In many ways, this cynical attempt by the senior executives of CASA to attack the long-standing CVD policy position of Australia, in concert with their intention to use the AAT to wind that policy back, has dulled some of the glimmer of hope that the industry attributed to your Aviation Safety Regulatory Review (ASRR).

“Given the path that CASA seems determined to follow in regard to CVD pilots, AIPA strongly recommends that you accept the evidence of many years of safe operations by CVD pilots in Australia that this is not a safety issue and that you consequently intervene to direct a more sensible and less expensive approach to whatever procedural issue that is motivating CASA to further alienate much of the Australian aviation industry.”

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Fifty shades of red and green – Opinion

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What on earth is the problem that Dr Navathe and CASA are expending so much energy trying to solve? It certainly has the close attention of hundreds of Australian pilots as yet another of their number, John O’Brien, prepares to confront CASA’s massive publicly funded legal firepower in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in a hearing set down for July 21. The case is scheduled to run for two weeks, and sources close to the matter believe CASA has about a dozen expert witnesses (mostly optometrists) from all over the world and, we’ve been told, has engaged Ian Harvey QC, to parade them before the AAT to convince the Tribunal that aeroplanes will start plummeting out of the sky because some of their pilots, in common with around 8% of the world’s male population, have some degree of colour vision deficiency (CVD). CASA lawyer Joseph Rule told a recent Senate Estimates hearing that CASA’s costs for this extravaganza had already reached about $43,000, and when pushed a bit more by Senator Fawcett he also admitted to that “It would not be out of the realms of possibility to accumulate another $40,000 in costs.” Is there $83,000 worth of demonstrably enhanced safety in there somewhere? Other (usually reliable) sources reckon CASA’s ultimate total costs of running the O’Brien case could stack up to somewhere between $300,000 and $400,000 – not counting John O’Brien’s costs of course, and they’re wondering out loud whether all those dollars might not be better spent scouring global accident history for events that have any statistical link at all with CVD. Aha! It seems there’s a new development that can maybe shine a little more light into those dark corners. One of Dr Navathe’s colleagues, Mr Peter Fereday at the CASA “Permissions Centre”, wrote to all AOC holders on June 05 that:

“Recent medical research indicates that the safety-related implications of an individual’s CVD may be more significant than they were initially considered to be.

And the following day in a similar letter he told all CVD-affected pilots about the same “recent medical research.” Our curiosity aroused, we asked CASA’s redoubtable spokesperson Peter Gibson…….

Could CASA please direct me to the references to the original medical research papers that present the evidence referred to in the first and third paragraphs of the attached letter? [That’s Mr Fereday’s letter to AOC holders about CVD.]

…… and after only six days of probing, good old reliable PG bounced right back:

  • The recent medical research mentioned by CASA in its letter to AOC holders of 5 June 2014 refers to the research described in an article by Dougal B Watson, principal medical officer of the New Zealand CAA [and Dr Navathe’s former boss in NZ], appearing in the February 2014 issue of the Journal of Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine.
  • In May 2014, an article appeared in the magazine Aerosafety World, published by the Flight Safety Foundation, summarising Dr Watson’s research on inconsistencies in the assessment of pilots with CVD.

Enlightenment at last? Afraid not. It transpires that the article is only available to super-rich people who can afford to commit US$30 (and their credit card details) to a little-known offshore organisation, especially before checking product quality. However as we were coming to grips with this formidable challenge to astute journalism, a copy of Dr Watson’s treatise fell off the back of a passing truck, and we were back in business. Or so we thought. But a careful perusal of the document, tantalisingly titled Lack of lnternational Uniformity in Assessing Color [sic] Vision Deficiency in Professional Pilots, quickly convinced us we must have the wrong bit of paper. A note attached to the article off the truck had warned:

Take a gander at this rubbish. This [Dr Watson’s treatise] is not evidence of anything of any consequence in this entire debate. Indeed, it is evidence of what a mess the aviation colour perception standard is in worldwide. Imagine relying on this as legal evidence to impress a judge just how dangerous colour vision defective pilots are!

A bit harsh? Well not really. If I were Mr Fereday (or Peter Gibson) I’d be quietly seeking a second opinion before I passed on anything originating from the source of those assertions. Let’s remind ourselves: “Recent medical research indicates that the safety-related implications of an individual’s CVD may be more significant than they were initially considered to be.” Can CASA point out any recent research presented in the Watson article that indicates anything of the sort? As anybody familiar with the debate would observe, the Watson prose is packed with subjective assertions, mind-numbing statistics, tables and flow charts that are in no way relevant to the “safety-related implications of an individual’s CVD”. In fact they don’t depict any safety-relevant medical research, and are in bad English, exacerbated by American spelling. The reason Watson doesn’t refer to relevant accident statistics (because there aren’t any) and his article comes up with just two not quite earth-shattering assertions that actually admit in its two listed findings:

“The main conclusions from this research are that:

  • There is a high degree of variation between States in the detection and medical assessment of CVD applicants; and
  • The observed variation stems not from the wording of the medical standards of the States, but from the application of those standards.

So 190 separate states have all figured out different but similar satisfactory ways of managing the same issue, right? Furthermore Dr Watson’s research actually refers to:

  • the paucity of documented aircraft accidents or incidents where CVD is implicated as a contributory factor.” [Because there are none]. And states that:
  • It is beyond the scope of this report to analyze [analyse] the issues and the debates concerning CV standards and civil aviation”.

So! Dud information has been unintentionally passed back to us via CASA PR? We haven’t yet seen any AOC-holder response to Mr Fereday’s June 5 letter, but its next-day follow-up to pilots has already caused at least one pilot body to reach for its keyboard and mouse. The Australian Federation of Air Pilots has directed a sharp response from its President Capt Bryan Murray to current CASA CEO John McCormick:

Dear Mr McCormick,

Re: Colour Vision Deficiency (CVD)

I am writing on behalf of the AFAP to express our concern over the letter dated 5 June 2014 from Peter Fereday to AOC holders regarding Colour Vision Deficiency (CVD).

The AFAP believes it is unreasonable and inappropriate that CASA is asking companies or the affected pilots to make assessments about their ability to hold a medical certificate. CASA issued the medical certificates in question and the affected pilots have been operating under these certificates in good faith.

AOC holders and the pilots themselves are not privy to the “recent medical research” to which CASA refers in its letter nor are they medically qualified to make the assessment requested. If CASA wish to change the regulations regarding colour vision then CASA should follow the correct and established processes. CASA’s letter of 5 June 2014 is in our view an abuse of process.

We request that CASA formally retract the letter of 5 June 2014.

Please also be aware that we will be supporting any of our members who are unfairly discriminated against as a result of CASA’s letter.

Meanwhile nowhere has CASA attempted to express in cost benefit terms, the safety benefits its proposed actions would deliver. So what is the problem to which all that public expense is supposed to be the answer? Where’s the history? Where are all the accidents that are linked to CVD pilots? Although there isn’t any such history, there’s plenty that covers related legal activity. In October 1987 the AAT reviewed a negative decision by the (then) Civil Aviation Authority that had been made in respect of Dr Arthur Pape, a licensed pilot, medical practitioner and DAME, and recognised as a world expert on colour deficiency in aviation. However the AAT decision was only in respect of Dr Pape’s private pilot licence, and imposed restrictions related to aircraft equipment, night flying, maximum takeoff weight and cruising speed, but and weather conditions. 18 months later in April 1989 the Tribunal heard another application by a CVD pilot, this one from commercial pilot Hugh Denison, a young colour defective pilot who had qualified for night flight in New Zealand, but who was prohibited by the CAA from night flight in Australia. To quote Dr Pape, whose interest in these issues has never wavered:

“Again, the appeal succeeded and the ban on night flight was overturned for all colour defective pilots in Australia. To this date, the Denison appeal is still the most comprehensive examination of aviation colour vision standards that has ever been conducted in the entire world. The hearings lasted for over 30 days and called witnesses including experienced pilots and air traffic controllers, optometrists and visual perception psychologists to name just a few. As a direct result of the appeal’s success, many such pilots found doors opening to career opportunities that were previously denied to them”.

This AAT hearing resulted in an order that:

The decision under review is set aside and, in substitution for it, it is decided that the applicant is to be granted, under regulation 63 of the Civil Aviation Regulations, a commercial pilot licence to fly fixed wing aircraft and rotary wing aircraft, the said licence to be subject to only the following two conditions:-

(1)That he is not permitted to pilot an aircraft in international air navigation except with the permission of the appropriate authority of the country concerned;

(2) That he is not permitted to pilot aircraft within control zones unless the aircraft being flown is fitted with radio apparatus such that he can maintain two-way communication on appropriate frequencies.

In a detailed analysis of its decision, the Tribunal explained that it was running a “test case” and it also explained why: “We understand that there are a considerable number of other pilots with defective colour vision who have requested the granting of licences which do not contain a condition prohibiting their piloting aircraft at night. For that reason the respondent [CASA] indicated that it wished to conduct this case as a test case. “Mr Rose [Appearing for CASA], therefore, informed the Tribunal that the respondent intended to present its case in a manner which would encompass not only the applicant’s situation but also broader issues relating generally to defective colour vision. At the request of the respondent [CASA] the Attorney-General granted legal aid to the applicant to ensure that he was not disadvantaged by the respondent presenting his case in that manner. “The matters which we have to consider in these proceedings have consequently been extended well beyond those which the applicant [Mr Denison] originally sought to raise, that is to say whether his defective colour vision made it unsafe for him personally to pilot an aircraft at night. Costs to the various parties in the Denison case have not been identified, but the AAT discussed in great detail the whole procedure it had adopted, all of the issue-related questions asked and answered, the witnesses, areas in which there was broad agreement, types of CVD, the technologies used in assessing it, and its safety relevance in flight operations at all levels. The decision document also contains detailed analysis of every related issue discussed by witnesses and laid the foundations for about 15 years of relative truce. The ruling was accepted by all parties and has been the basis under which CVD pilots have been operating successfully until CASA resumed hostilities. The last two paragraphs of the AAT decision are relevant to Mr O’Brien’s case:.

78. We recommend that suitable practical tests should be devised so that a protan [Mr O’Brien’s condition] can be tested individually, if he wishes, at his own expense to ascertain the extent of the loss of his ability to perceive the intensity of red lights. If his distant visual acuity is such that, when allowance is made for the loss of ability to perceive the intensity of red lights, he is able to see red lights at the furthest distance that they can be seen by persons who have normal colour vision and the distant acuity required by ANO 47.1.2.13 or ANO 47.1.3.13, as appropriate to the type of licence sought, a licence should be granted to him under regulation 63 subject to only the two conditions referred to above. If a change in his visual acuity is detected thereafter in the course of any routine medical examination, he should be required to undergo the practical test again. Otherwise a licence granted to a protan under regulation 63 should be subject to the additional condition that the pilot does not fly an aircraft at night.

79. Finally, while recognising that the Tribunal has no power to review decisions of the Authority to set medical standards under regulation 62, we suggest that protanomals ought not to be totally prevented, as they are at present, from meeting the colour vision standard. It appears from Dr Samuel’s evidence that some persons with mild protanomaly are able to perceive the existence of red lights at a distance which is as great as, or greater than, the furthest distance at which a person with normal colour vision and distant visual acuity of 6/6 can do so. We suggest that the colour vision standard be altered so as to permit such mild protanomals to take the Farnsworth Lantern test and, if they pass it, to meet the standard and so be qualified, so far as colour vision is concerned, for the grant of an unconditional licence.

Those two paragraphs go to the heart of Mr O’Brien’s situation and that of many others who are now threatened despite thousands of hours of uneventful flight. It is completely untruthful to assert as CASA has, that there is anything in Dr Watson’s paper to suggest that individuals’ CVD pilot issues “may be more significant than they were initially considered to be.” The only thing that has changed on the CVD scene since the AAT delivered its comprehensive analysis, findings and recommendations, has been the accumulation of several million more flying hours by CVD pilots without a CVD related accident. The person or persons responsible for this attempt to wind back the clock needs to be held accountable for their actions. If CASA’s recruiting consultancy identifies a CEO candidate who meets all the key qualities it is seeking in terms of experience, critical competencies for success and other attributes, the newcomer will easily see this campaign for what it is. A return to reality on CVD issues might then be one of the many early outcomes sought by the 269 contributors to the ASRR. An important footnote We would point out that there has in fact been one case where CVD got a mention in an accident investigation; however its CV relevance is widely disputed. On July 26, 2002, a Boeing 727-238F freighter collided with trees on short final and crashed short of the runway at Tallahassee, Florida. The NTSB report said: The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was the captain’s and first officer’s failure to establish and maintain a proper glidepath during the night visual approach to landing. “Contributing to the accident was a combination of the captain’s and first officer’s fatigue, the captain’s and first officer’s failure to adhere to company flight procedures, the captain’s and flight engineer’s failure to monitor the approach, and the first officer’s colour vision deficiency.” However the text of the NTSB report contained no supporting discussion of CVD or its role in the accident, and did not explain why both the captain and the flight engineer (who was also a pilot,) reported seeing the same displays on the PAPI as the co-pilot did.

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Colour vision deficient pilots see red

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While the topic of aberrant regulatory conduct dominates the nation’s aviation dialogue, we’re wondering whether a letter from CASA to all employers of pilots might represent a practical joke, an early example of a scorched earth strategy, or an act of rebellion against the ASRR’s erudite recommendations.

We’d speculate that such a bizarre missive could hardly have originated from the aviation medics, who would be well aware that when you want to quote medical research convincingly in support of a position, you need to provide a reference to the relevant original medical research papers that present the evidence referred to. (We’ve requested that reference from CASA and are still awaiting a response.)

It also seems unlikely that the letter got the nod from CASA’s legal office, because it seems to be asking AOC holders and/or pilots to make decisions which CASA’s not prepared to make itself.

No, it’s signed by the executive in charge of CASA’s” Permissions Centre,” sometimes referred to by disenchanted permission seekers as the “Sheltered Workshop.” But what on earth it hopes to achieve is difficult to discern. It tells employers that “the possibility exists that your pilot’s CVD may be of a type and/or severity that could adversely affect aviation safety to a degree greater than was believed to be the case when the medical certificates were issued,” and then it goes on to tell their employers to make decisions they are not equipped to make because CASA simply hasn’t told them what the hell it’s on about and it doesn’t tell them what the problem is and what it considers is an “appropriate” course to take.

Here’s the letter which all AOC holders received on June 5. We follow it with a commentary by Dr Arthur Pape, who is widely acknowledged as Australia’s leading expert on the issue of colour vision deficiency (CVD).

If you’re bewildered by the letter, you’ll find Dr Pape’s analysis enlightening by comparison, and indicative of a clear way forward for any responsible medical official seeking to develop intelligent and effective policies on this not-so-complex issue.

5 June 2014

Dear AOC holder,

Colour Vision Deficiency

I am writing to inform you of actions the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has taken in relation to pilots with a recognised colour vision deficiency (CVD) in the light of recent medical research involving the assessment of CVD, and the possible implications of these developments for affected pilots and the operators who employ them.

A number of pilots have taken their medical certificates issued subject to a limiting condition because they do not meet the applicable medical standard for colour perception specified in the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR). You may employ one or more pilots whose medical certificates are subject to such a condition.

Recent medical research indicates that the safety-related implications of an individual’s CVD may be more significant than they were initially considered to be, and the possibility exists that your pilots CVD may be of a type and/or severity that could adversely affect aviation safety to a degree greater than was believed to be the case when the medical certificates were issued. CASA is reviewing the situation and will consider what further action, if any, may need to be taken on the basis of that review, at which time affected medical certificate holders will be notified accordingly.

In the meantime, CASA has written to all potentially affected pilots advising them to consider whether it is safe for them to continue to exercise their flight crew privileges subject only to the existing CVD-related condition, and encouraging them to seek the advice of their personal physician or designated aviation medical examiner about any adjustments that should be made to their flying practices, pending the outcome of CASA’s review.

As I told recipients of that advice I would be doing, I write to you now, as the holder of an air operator’s certificate (AOC) who may employ one or more affected pilots, to encourage you to consider whether it is safe to allow those pilots to continue to exercise flight crew privileges under your AOC, subject only to the existing condition, and what adjustments to those arrangements you may consider to be appropriate, in the interests of safety, pending CASA’s further determination of the matter.

For more information visit CASA’s website at:

http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD::pc=PC_91593.

For further details, please contact Dr Pooshan Navathe, principal medical officer, on 131757. Yours sincerely,

 

Peter Fereday

Executive Manager, Industry Permissions

Enlightenment from Dr Arthur Pape

The Aviation Colour Perception Standard[i] (ACPS), as specified by ICAO and replicated by practically all signatory states, requires that: “The applicant shall be required to demonstrate the ability to perceive readily those colours the perception of which is necessary for the safe performance of duties.”

At its philosophical/scientific core, this so-called “standard” represents a conclusion (or argument) based on three implicit assumptions, as follows:

Assumption 1

There is extensive use of colour-coded information in the aviation environment.

Assumption 2

The “safe performance of duties” in the aviation environment is dependent on “the ability to perceive readily those colours necessary etc etc……..”.

Assumption 3

Without ‘the ability to perceive readily those colours, the perception of which is necessary for the safe performance of duties”, these duties will be performed unsafely.

Discussion

The validity or “truth” of the ACPS relies entirely on the validity or “truth” of each of the three assumptions. In turn, the validity or “truth” of each of the assumptions relies on evidence, as opposed to opinion and/or established prejudice.

Let’s consider the first assumption. At the dawn of aviation, over a hundred years ago, colour coding was used solely in the form of signalling by means of coloured flags or lights, as the means of communication between people on the ground and in the air. It was suggested that people who could not readily perceive the colours of those signals might perform their duties “unsafely”, and that suggestion, under the circumstances of the day, would have had some merit. Out of this there arose the ACPS, whose wording has changed little from those heady days of cloth covered aeroplanes and simple instructions to pilots using simple coloured objects in a simple “code”.

Since then there has been an exponential increase in the use of colour throughout the aviation environment, both in the aviation physical environment and in and on aeroplanes. The list of uses of colour is enormous, and the validity of the first assumption is self-evident to anyone with even a minimal knowledge of the aviation environment.

Result: Assumption 1 is “True”.

Assumption 2 is, however, problematic. For this assumption to be valid, it needs to be demonstrated that the perception of the colour(s) is sufficient and necessary to see the information that is required for the “safe performance of duties”. In other words, “see the colour” equals “see the information”, which results in “safe performance of duties”. This assumption could be tested empirically, but this type of work has never been done in respect to the aviation environment.

Result: Assumption 2 remains an unproven assumption

To paraphrase assumption 3, would go like this: “see no (or different) colour” equals “see no (or wrong) information” which results in “unsafe performance”. To digress briefly, let me state that the existence of individuals with colour vision deficiencies (CVD) is a proven reality. That 8 to 9 percent of the male population and just less than 1 percent of the female population have one or other of the various types of CVD is beyond any doubt. Further, there are numerous reliable and proven tests available to detect and classify the severity of any particular CVD condition. Let me add also that the CAD test is an excellent test to diagnose and quantify CVD conditions.

So, in short, the ACPS, via the implicit Assumption 3 would predict that people with CVD should perform the duties (involved in flying an aeroplane) unsafely. This proposition could be tested empirically (i.e., by measurement, observation and analysis). No formal empirical testing of assumption 3 has ever been conducted.

Result: Assumption 3 is also problematic.

It is a fact that pilots with CVD have been around for a very long time and in considerable numbers. For almost a century, the FAA has applied a wide variety of colour vision tests and practical tests, whereby tens of thousands of CVD pilots either passed the ACPS or were granted waivers against the standard. Since 1989, a few thousand Australian CVD pilots have enjoyed the freedom to fly at night and many hundreds have achieved successful careers in airline operations. If Assumption 3 were “true” one would expect there to be evidence of “unsafe performance of duties” by these pilots. This should be particularly evident in the incident and accident records kept by the aviation authorities of the USA and Australia. A landmark study in the mid 1970s by two researchers (Dille and Booze) working for the FAA examined the accident records of the large group of CVD pilots with a “waiver” and found not even one accident where the existence of a colour vision defect could have contributed to the cause. Furthermore, the accident rate for this group was no different than that of the general pilot population (accidents per 100,000 hrs of recent experience). Until 2002, the FAA had no record of any accident attributed to CVD, and since 2002 there have been none. The significance of 2002 is that in that year a Fedex B727 crashed while on a PAPI-guided night visual approach, and the CVD status of the flying FO was attributed a causal role in the crash. However, two other crew had normal colour vision and also did not see what the PAPI should have been showing them. The relationship between this crash and the significance of CVD is highly contentious. The ATSB and CASA have admitted they have no record of any accident attributed to CVD.

The Australian experience since the Denison case in 1989 has provided excellent positive evidence against the “truth” of Assumption 3. There are estimated to have been several thousand CVD pilots operating with either no restriction or minimal restriction in the period in question, and a significant number at the highest level of airline operations. I can say with confidence that we have examples of even the most severe kinds of CVD working as captains and FOs on the full range of airline type aircraft. These pilots are surveilled, trained, tested and examined in exactly the same way that pilots with normal colour vision are handled. They pass and keep on meeting all requirements “necessary” for the “safe performance of their duties”, and these assessments are made by duly qualified examiners of airmen, as opposed to aviation medical doctors or optometrists. This is taken by many informed commentators as evidence that Assumption 3 is “false”, and raises the question as to whether the ACPS serves any useful role in modern aviation.

It is abundantly evident that the appeal by John O’Brien [A pilot with CVD] and the unprecedented interrogation of CASA on this topic in the Australian Senate has triggered a tsunami of hysterical and irrational activity within CASA. It is my view that CASA’s actions and the responses by the Director and the Principal Medical Officer to the Senate Estimates Hearings reflect an absurd and indefensible position. Claims of “medical evidence” by both in support of their stance cannot be substantiated because such evidence does not exist.

There is no “rocket science” in any aspect of this saga.


 

 

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A health-giving dose of reality – Opinion

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In common with many others, ProAviation had been a little cynical about the fate of the Aviation Safety Regulation Review (ASRR) panel’s report after it left the Review Panel’s office. Maybe we were reading too much into the way interacting government agencies managed to shrug off the most significant recommendations of the Senate References Committee enquiry into the management of the investigation into the Pel-Air ditching at Norfolk Island.

Plenty of time, we thought, but let’s not waste it. We began by collecting ASRR submissions from industry representative groups, operator, manufacturer and maintenance organisations, professional associations, training and educational organisations, private and commercial aviators, lawyer groups and individual practitioners, trade unions, aggrieved individuals, and even commercial operators of the burgeoning unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) industry.

From a dozen of these, we selected an equal number of sample paragraphs which, we believed, represented a good cross-section of industry problems. We’d then measure the ASRR recommendations against industry’s hopes and expectations when the report finally become available.

Then on June 3, Deputy Prime Minister Warren Truss took everybody by surprise by tabling the entire 170 page ASRR report and simultaneously publishing it on his Department’s website. For good measure, he announced that “written submissions to the Review will be made public over the coming days except for those provided in confidence and a number of others about which the Government is seeking legal advice,” and inviting further public submissions deadlined for a month later.

Anybody scanning through the 169 submissions to the ASRR Panel is likely to observe frequently recurring threads and themes, most of which the panel has also identified.

The first of these is that the mutual trust and respect that normally form the cornerstones of viable industry regulation have all but disappeared. “Been trashed” is their commonest way of expressing this.

The second is the events that have already laid waste to countless jobs and businesses, leaving in their wake the bleakest imaginable investment landscape for any aviation business seeking to recover or grow in the current regulatory environment. The concerns and grievances range through every area of industry/regulator interface and include the regulatory review program’s one-way consultation processes, regulator micromanagement and its related costs to business, a legal office that seems obsessed with treating aircraft operators, pilots and maintainers as though they were dealing with bikie gangs, the charging regime for mandated regulatory services, and the endless paperwork delays in processing applications for the permissions, approvals and certifications they are required to obtain to go about their businesses.

And the third is that the damage has already been so sustained and savage in so many industry facets as to be unrepairable without immediate acknowledgement through resolute remedial action. A dominant theme among the submissions is the premise that only a root and branch reorganisation can achieve what is essential for recovery.

A feature of the ASRR process is the depth and diversity of most of the submissions, and in particular the range of solutions that have been put forward.

ProAviation has reviewed a large proportion of contributions to the review, and has also spoken with numerous industry figures about what outcomes they hope for to reverse the collapse of mutual trust.

The following selected comments, each one from widely differing individuals and organisations, are characteristic of what industry observers are saying about those problems. The numbered paragraphs are the dozen individual issues raised in the various submissions, and relevant comment from the Review is in blue typeface:

1.       “The [CASA ] legal department can only cause the troubles they do if they’re allowed to by the senior management and the board. So if your outlook on the world is a legalistic view where you invert the 80/20 rule and say that only 20% of people are trying to do the right thing so we must prosecute the crap out of everyone else – if you’ve got that fundamentally stupid blinkered approach in management; forget about whether it’s aviation or not, you will then never build an organisation that has the trust of industry. That’s a headline that CASA hates and yet it’s backed up by every independent assessment of CASA; they are a low-trust organisation driven by legal priorities, not by safety outcomes.”

ASRR:The Panel concludes that CASA and industry need to build an effective collaborative relationship on a foundation of mutual trust and respect. Therefore, CASA needs to set a new strategic direction. The selection of a new Director of Aviation Safety should concentrate on finding an individual with leadership and change management abilities, rather than primarily aviation expertise. Other jurisdictions have appointed leaders without an aviation background, who have been successful in changing the strategic direction of the safety regulator.

2.       “The first and vital conclusion the review must draw is that CASA has lost the trust of the industry – all else follows from that, starting with the obvious immediate requirement to restore trust. If that conclusion is not drawn, then nothing the review can recommend, nor the government mandate, will make the slightest bit of difference to the current situation and further decay is inevitable.”

ASRR:In the Panel’s view, CASA is falling short of the standards it ought to attain, judged by the ANAO’s [Australian National Audit Office] six principles. Based on industry’s perception, CASA falls short on Transparency and Openness, being seen by industry as closed to engagement. CASA’s Leadership also appears wanting, with a failure to translate good procedures and policies on paper into effective behaviours across the organisation. While CASA appears to be trusted by many in government, the industry’s trust in CASA is failing, compromising CASA’s Stewardship, and industry perceives CASA’s Accountability as being compromised.

3.       “Where the system can break down is when there is friction between the relevant surveillance officers of CASA and the operator and/or its chief pilot, with the result that trust is eroded and the communication and feed back necessary for both parties is diminished.”

ASRR: All regulators face the challenge of keeping up-to-date with technology, and must acknowledge that industry holds higher levels of expertise, especially for new generation aircraft like the A380 and B787. Some regulators, such as the UK CAA, advised the Panel that a collaborative working relationship with industry assists in keeping them across the latest technology and developments.

The Panel also examined options used in other countries for Airworthiness Inspectors (AWIs) and FOIs to maintain currency in their areas of expertise. The Panel considers there would be merit in CASA and industry jointly developing a model for an industry exchange program. This program would allow CASA to access expertise, and it could be used to facilitate the finalisation of CASA’s Regulatory Reform Program, as discussed in Chapter 5.

The Panel discussed this proposal with the Chief Pilots of Australia’s major airlines and other industry representatives, who were supportive of the proposal in principle.

An industry exchange program needs appropriate probity frameworks, to ensure that secondees to CASA are not in positions that could influence decisions related to their employer, or could allow access to confidential information relating to their employer’s competitors.

The Panel recommends that:

9          The Civil Aviation Safety Authority develops a staff exchange program with industry.

4.       “I have observed a change in the policy of the role of the regulator from one which directed its experienced officers to communicate directly with members of the GA (general aviation) industry on operational and regulatory matters to provide advice ‘one-on-one’ to enhance the members’ knowledge and understanding of the rules and operational/maintenance issues which may affect air safety, and to foster good relations with the industry so as to encourage valuable feed-back; to the regulator of today, which appears to be focussed on an inflexible policy of strict compliance and penalties. This has had the regrettable result that many members of GA have expressed a reluctance to talk to CASA out of fear.

The Panel recommends that:

21         The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes its organisational structure to a client-oriented output model.

22       The Civil Aviation Safety Authority establishes small offices at specific industry centres to improve monitoring, service quality, communications and collaborative relationship

5.       “The changes now incorporate a new ‘Area Approval’ process through CASA for ‘each and every individual flight operation’. [For regulated UAV operations] The new process incurs the same processing fee of $160 per hour and an estimate is provided by CASA after initial application. Both CASA & Airservices state they cannot process an application for these new ‘Area Approvals’ inside of 21 days minimum. Most applications however are running into several months and hundreds of dollars.”

ASRR: Industry complained to the Panel about the timeliness and quality of CASA services, particularly when issuing approvals. Delays can affect the livelihoods of individuals and the viability of businesses. Delays of months or even years were reported in some instances, particularly relating to licence and Air Operator’s Certificate (AOC) approvals.

The Panel recommends that:

8          The Civil Aviation Safety Authority:

a.         reinstates publication of Key Performance Indicators for service delivery functions;

b.         conducts a stakeholder survey every two years to measure the health of its relationship with industry;

c.         accepts regulatory authority applications online unless there is a valid technical reason against it ;

d.         adopts the same Code of Conduct and Values that apply to the Australian Public Service under the Public Service Act 1999;.

6.       “There can be little doubt that the decline of Australian aviation as a world class aviation nation over the past decade has reached nadir within the past five years. The endless, costly determination to be seen as ‘technically’ compliant with ICAO whist arrogantly remaining outside of the ‘real’ spirit and intent of ICAO compliance underpins a significant portion of the issues with which the review panel must come to terms.”

      ASRR: Although opinions differ. the Panel estimates that the RRP would take at least another five  years to complete. Furthermore, the final product of regulatory reform would not meet the aviation community’s needs and would not be consistent with the ICAO principles for plain language, easily understood, safety rules. Nor would the final regulations be harmonised with those of any foreign jurisdiction. The 25-plus year history of regulatory reform has been consuming the industry, and distracting the aviation community from the objective of managing safety in its operations. On this basis, the Panel concludes that continuing along the current path would not be in the interests of aviation safety in Australia and that a new approach must be developed for regulatory reform.

NOTE: The above has been slightly re-worded in consultation with the ASRR so the grammar won’t be misinterpreted in a way that suggests retaining the status quo was still an option.

7.       “Australia’s aviation industry, like all other industries in Australia, is seen as ‘overregulated’ and stifled by red tape. Regulatory development over the last couple of decades has not adopted the principles contained in the government’s Best Practice Regulation Handbook and now part of Government policy – regulatory reduction and reduction in red tape. This reform has failed on both accounts.”

ProAviation Comment: See the response to point 5 above. Regarding the remaining five points, each referes in its own way to various apparent aberrations in policy and practice. we believe the following extracts from the report reflct discussion and recommendations that are relevant to necessary changes in the areas of leadership, governance, attitudes and praacctices including closer government and board involvement:

ASRR:

*     A simple Statement of Expectations might be adequate where the agency is operating effectively. In the current situation, more in-depth guidance is required, similar to the 2003 Charter Letter. The Panel considers the new Board should have a clear and unambiguous mandate from government.

*       While a number of skills are required amongst CASA’s senior management, they do not all need to be held by one person. The DAS should have a supportive and complementary team of deputies and senior executives. The DAS should have an understanding of aviation, but does not need to be an operational expert. If CASA is structured and staffed appropriately, it should have sufficient subject matter expertise within the organisation, or be able to obtain that expertise from industry

*        A change in philosophy at CASA will be critical to make the recommendations in this report effective. A philosophical change requires a cultural change and this must be driven by the DAS.

8.       “Aviation should be encouraged by CASA as part of its formal charter. Having its charter limited to ‘Aviation Safety’ encourages negativism, which is widely seen in practice. There is no settled standard for ‘air safety’. This leaves CASA with a poorly identified obligation, a completely subjective mantra, and no obligation to act for the benefit of Australian aviation this is unsatisfactory on its face and should change. Perhaps the roles of regulation and administration should be separated, and the regulator given the dual roles of promotion of aviation as well as safety?”

ASRR:

The Panel recommends that:

6.         The Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s Board exercises full governance control. The non-executive directors should possess a range of appropriate skills and backgrounds in aviation, safety, management, risk, regulation, governance and government.

9.       “Our members are often negatively impacted by their dealings with CASA. Reasonable requests that should receive immediate and fair attention/approval fall into regulatory “black holes” where either no-one at CASA can provide an answer or where the applications just go missing altogether. The impression we get is one of a regulator where the majority of officers are extraordinarily afraid of making a decision lest they be wrong and their heads end up on the chopping block. As senior inspectors have retired, we have also noticed a distinct drop in the level and breadth of experience amongst CASA’s FOIs, leading to a complete unfamiliarity with our operating requirements. There are also several cases where these officers have approached their roles with a pre-existing bias which interferes with their obligation to give our members fair and timely consideration on their individual applications.”

ASRR: The Panel concludes that CASA and industry need to build an effective collaborative relationship on a foundation of mutual trust and respect. Therefore, CASA needs to set a new strategic direction. The selection of a new Director of Aviation Safety should concentrate on finding an individual with leadership and change management abilities, rather than primarily aviation expertise. Other jurisdictions have appointed leaders without an aviation background, who have been successful in changing the strategic direction of the safety regulator.

10.   “Guidance material on CASA’s enforcement policy which guides CASA decision makers should be legally binding and itself enforceable under an Ombudsman-type arrangement akin to the Aircraft Noise Ombudsman.”

ASRR: The message that CASA presents to industry is not always consistent with the message in its manuals. The DAS outlined CASA’s regulatory philosophy in a presentation to a Senate Estimates Committee in 2009:

Similar announcements of CASA’s firm regulatory philosophy have been made in other presentations to the industry, and appear to be evident in the trends in CASA enforcement action. Although the rationale for ‘firmness’ in regulatory oversight is understood, and clearly has a place, the industry’s assessment is that CASA takes an overly aggressive position, which is having an overriding and consuming influence over the aviation community and damaging trust. Combined with concerns in other parts of the safety oversight program as described later in this chapter, the result is an industry that has retreated from open dialogue and participation.

11.   “In the matter of [a flight training organisation], the applicant paid to CASA an ‘up front’ fee of $8,000 ………to assess its application for the issue of an Air Operator’s Certificate. The assessment by CASA of the key personnel and other aspects of the AOC application was mandatory by legislation. A serious problem existed in this case in that although CASA demanded and was paid the fee for the assessment, the officers of CASA had already determined that the application for the AOC would be refused on the alleged grounds that its CEO and proposed chief pilot/CFI was not a fit and proper person to hold the chief pilot/CFI position. Despite CASA having determined that the applicant’s application for an AOC would be refused, CASA refused to stop its assessment, retained the $8,000 and demanded that the applicant pay another $1,600.”

ProAviation comment:

These allegations are unsurprising to anybody who is familiar with the complaints of random aberrant behaviour and the absence of effective avenues for its timely redress. In fact our own submission details how an operator (now our publisher) paid $20,000 in advance as an initial application fee for a low capacity regular public transport AOC. Later examining the CASA deliberations he came into possession of a string of in-house CASA emails that blatantly discussed various “tactical” options for delaying the progress of the application including flat refusal, deliberate delays in exchanging correspondence, or barraging him with requests for further information.

The review committee does not directly address these and other apparent abuses of power. However, throughout its report its comments and recommendations related to management and governance which if implemented could be expected to put such events behind us. Among those comments and measures are:

ASRR: Several concerns were raised regarding the timeliness and effectiveness of the ICC [Industry Complaints Commissioner],  Including ‘the current system of the ICC reporting direct to the CASA CEO is seen by industry is largely ineffective and,  again, discourages some industry complaints due to fear of retribution, and  it is essential that there is a reliable, robust and transparent Complaints process that is managed in a timely manner.’

The panel recommends that:

37:        The Civil Aviation Safety Authority amends the current Terms of Reference of the Industry Complaints Commissioner so that:

a.         the ICC reports directly to the CASA Board

b.         no CASA staff are excluded from the ICC’s jurisdiction

c.         the ICC will receive complaints that relate to both the merits and the process of matters

d.         on merits matters, including aviation medical matters, the ICC is empowered to convene an appropriately constituted review panel, chaired by a CASA non-executive director, to review the decision

e.         while all ICC findings are non-binding recommendations, the original decision-maker is required to give reasons to the CASA Board if a recommendation is not followed.

Commendably, item (b) removes a controversial restriction which immunised various senior officials from complaints to the Industry Complaints Commissioner.

12.   “When industry first heard of the shift of CASA to being a ‘Big R’ regulator, industry accepted that clearly that was the right of the regulator and, industry assumed, was being done with the support of the CASA Board and the Minister. What industry did not anticipate was that the move to a ‘Big R’ regulator was code for the introduction of a bullying and intimidatory culture that would lead to a breakdown in relationships between CASA and industry, a significant reduction in the focus on innovative safety programs and increasingly shrill policing activities that are not delivering real safety improvements.”

ASRR: A hard-line regulator creates an environment in which regulated entities, be they air operators, maintenance providers, airports, or even air navigation service providers, may withhold information. Industry consultation has highlighted that many in the Australian aviation industry now actively avoid engagement with CASA unless absolutely necessary.

And in case that hasn’t sunk in, elsewhere in the report:

ASRR: The Panel is concerned by the dichotomy between industry’s and CASA’s perceptions of their relationship. While CASA is clearly aware of specific instances of industry dissatisfaction, it does not appear to fully comprehend the level or breadth of ill-feeling across all industry sectors. This lack of comprehension is especially apparent at the senior leadership level, including within the CASA Board.

The Panel considers CASA should take steps to better understand the issues of concern to industry and enhance the level of dialogue, both through a more productive two-way relationship, and also through initiating regular, anonymous stakeholder surveys to gauge industry’s perceptions.

ProAviation comment

Considering its timeframes and its task, the ASRR panel has performed a remarkable service to the industry and presented it in an erudite way. While it may appear at first glance to have overlooked or glossed over some specific issues, it has produced a set of findings and recommendations which, if all were heeded and implemented, would resolve those issues in any case, by re-directing or replacing people as necessary and replacing the structures, philosophies and attitudes that bred the issues.

The ASRR report should be mandatory reading for everybody in industry including those regulatory employees who hope still to be regulatory employees in six months; and also for the incoming CEO and Board.

The remaining challenge for the Minister will be to protect the ASRR recommendations from the watering down that was inflicted on the Pel-Air/ATSB/CASA investigation.

There are still people who need to understand that even you if know you’re right and you know everybody else is wrong, you still have a problem.

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Aviation report welcomed – but industry looks for action

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The Aerial Agricultural Association of Australia (AAAA) has welcomed the report of the Aviation Safety Regulatory Review (ASRR) as “a useful step forward in fixing Australia’s aviation safety system,” but says industry focus has swiftly moved onto urgent Government action to address the problems.

“Industry feels vindicated in its criticism of CASA’s culture, which the report found to be ‘not appropriate for an advanced aviation nation such as Australia,” says RAAA CEO Phil Hurst.

“The Minister now has a well-considered independent report that makes the case for change. The report recommends some useful steps forward that could be taken quickly to remedy the significant challenges faced by industry.

“AAAA believes the position of the current CASA Board and the senior management of CASA is simply untenable in the face of such stinging criticism regarding culture, values, performance, processes and outcomes.

“The CASA Board should immediately resign to clear the way for a completely new approach in line with most of the report’s findings.

“A range of recommendations, including a restructure of CASA to better match industry sectors, delegation of medical certificate issuing to designated aviation medical examiners (DAMEs), improvements to the Independent Complaints Commissioner, the establishment of merit decision reviews and greater oversight of CASA by the Department of Infrastructure will make a real difference to performance and should be implemented immediately.

“In conjunction with the Minister’s outstanding election commitment to establish an Aviation Ministerial Council, the suite of changes recommended should go a long way to putting CASA on a trajectory towards meeting international, Australian government and industry standards of performance.

“However, the report has a number of critical flaws and miscues that the Minister would be well advised to ignore, including the identification to CASA of all aircraft accident operator details. This recommendation fundamentally contradicts the need for a ‘just’ culture to be established before a regulator can be trusted to act fairly by the industry.

“Similarly, the move to strip ATSB of safety promotion responsibilities flies in the face of industry recommendations that clearly suggested the opposite – that ATSB receive CASA’s resources as ATSB’s better placed to deliver positive outcomes.

“CASA has clearly broken industry’s trust and this will only be rebuilt by positive and urgent outcomes – not just more words and business as usual”, said Mr Hurst.

ProAviation’s analysis of the ASRR Panel’s 170 page report will be on the site tomorrow.

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